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Articles 
A Judge’s Perspective on Perspectives 
Courses:  Three Suggested Rubrics . . . 
with Examples 
The Honorable Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr.1 
“[I]t is not enough for a man to be good; he must be good for  
something.” 
 —John Dewey2 
 
“The great human societies are the creation not of profiteers,  
but of dreamers.” 
—Rabindranath Tagore3 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of the legal system is to do justice, a succinct 
 
 1.  Associate Justice, Rhode Island Superior Court (ret.); Adjunct 
Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. provjust@cox.net. I am 
grateful for the comments and encouragement of David Logan and Carl 
Bogus, Dean and Professor respectively, at the Roger Williams University 
School of Law. The research and observations of Maura Clancy, School of Law 
’14, were invaluable. Naturally, any mistakes are mine alone. 
 2.  JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSPOHY OF EDUCATION 417 (Paul Monroe, Macmillian 1922) (1916). 
 3.  RABINDRANATH TAGORE, THE ENGLISH WRITINGS OF RABINDRANATH 
TAGORE VOLUME FOUR: ESSAYS 697 (Atlantic Publishers and Distributors 
2007). 
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precept easy to recall but problematic to define as a course of 
behavior.  If the animating principle of the rule of law were lodged 
in the quip by the early twentieth century legal scholar Zechariah 
Chafee as the desire “to settle a dispute between two persons 
without physical conflict,”4 then statistics about cases filed and 
disposed would supply the key to measuring success and failure.  
This is far from the full story, however, and the imperative 
charging the profession to do justice insistently both provokes and 
challenges. 
Indeed, one part of the nation’s legal apparatus is 
denominated as the criminal justice system and in popular 
discussions, references to “our system of justice” and the cries to 
“bring whoever did this heinous crime to justice” by prosecutors, 
editorialists, and lay persons are common.  Oaths administered to 
the principal custodians of the judicial system, the lawyers and 
the judges, require solemn promises to support and faithfully 
interpret the venerable and venerated documents that define, 
albeit with some mischievous imprecision, the fundamental 
principles of our system of ordered liberty and “to administer 
justice without respect to persons.”5  Moreover, judges on some 
courts are called “Justices,” as if their very beings are infused with 
traits associated with a dispassionate search for the goals of 
sagacity, probity, and fairness. 
Other declarations within the law, less esteemed than 
constitutions but nevertheless crucially important to lawyers and 
litigants, also mandate that judges and lawyers in the midst of a 
trial recognize that justice is their ultimate quest.  For example, 
the preamble to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure commands 
that the Rules shall be “construed and administered to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”6  
Similar directives are found in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence as well as their 
counterpart rules in every state.  Indeed, the most quoted jurist in 
American history,7 Benjamin Cardozo, wrote in his classic The 
 
 4.  Zechariah Chafee, Jr., A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 513, 519 (1924) (book 
review). 
 5.  See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006). 
 6.  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 7.  RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (Univ. of 
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Nature of the Judicial Process of the judicial responsibility to be 
alert to persistent demands to maximize “social welfare,” under 
which are subsumed considerations of justice: “[I]ts demands are 
those of religion or of ethics or of the social sense of justice, 
whether formulated in creed or system, or immanent in the 
common mind.”8 
The centrality of doing justice as the driving force within the 
legal profession, whether honored more in its breach than 
otherwise, was a prime motivating force behind the drafting of the 
Carnegie Report, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the 
Profession of Law9 (hereinafter “the Carnegie Report”) which 
today shapes the focus of the proponents of law school reform.  
“Doing justice” is a recurring theme throughout the two hundred 
pages of text as its authors seek to demonstrate how law schools 
may better prepare persons entering the profession to answer a 
question the authors believe attorneys should regularly ask 
themselves: “Does the responsibility to pursue substantive justice 
in individual cases and to consider the broader impact of one’s 
actions conflict with the advocacy on behalf of one’s client?”10 
Of course, the prevalence of the term “justice” within and 
without the legal profession is no guarantee that students 
entering law school will have more than a superficial awareness of 
its multiple meanings and provenances.  The parameters of 
justice, both reparative and distributive, have stimulated tomes 
over the centuries, written by luminaries from Plato and Aristotle, 
to Thomas Aquinas and Leibnitz, to John Locke and John Stuart 
Mill, down to John Rawls, Richard Posner, and Ronald Dworkin, 
and this is only the short list. However, most students entering 
law school have little or no familiarity with these thinkers and 
their analyses; and under the traditional law school curriculum, 
they will not become any more familiar with these thinkers unless 
some professor randomly interjects them. Though the Carnegie 
Report repeatedly lobbies for the primacy of professional 
 
Chicago Press 1993) (1990). 
 8.  BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72 (Yale 
Univ. Press 1991) (1921). 
 9.  WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD 
BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter Carnegie Report]. 
 10.  Id. at 131. 
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responsibility and ethical behavior, it does not note this 
substantive intellectual deficit or its causes. 
Law students are bright, earnest, and enthusiastic, but the 
paucity of their pre-law school preparation in the humanities can 
be proved both anecdotally and empirically. Consequently, law 
schools have more of a task than simply to teach basic legal 
doctrine and technique supplemented with some clinical 
experience:  they must remedy a deficit in the humanities as they 
simultaneously seek to restore the more noble values to what 
some identified as a troubled profession long before the Carnegie 
Report was published.11 
Law school deans and professors are aware of this challenge – 
call it an obligation if you will—and have been addressing it in 
various permutations for several decades, even longer at some 
institutions. Innovative programs in the 1960s and ‘70s sent 
second- and third-year students into the field to work at 
everything from poverty law clinics to anti-smoking foundations to 
Selective Service reform organizations and into seminars that 
offered elective credits in courses ranging from Chinese Law to 
Law and Literature; these programs developed on an ad hoc basis 
depending on the interest and motivation of individual professors 
and deans at various law schools,12 as well as pressure from 
socially engaged students in some instances. 
Seminars were part of the curriculum at many schools long 
before the Carnegie Institute decided to scrutinize legal 
professional education.  For decades, the seminar has allowed 
 
 11.  See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Death of An Honorable Profession, 71 
IND. L.J. 911 (1996); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING 
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Harvard Univ. Press 2001) (1993). 
 12.  This approach by these deans and professors is consonant with the 
American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of 
Law Schools and Admissions to the Bar Standard 3-302, which provide that 
law schools shall offer “substantial opportunities” for “instruction in . . . the 
history, goals, structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal 
profession and its members,” for “seminars, directed, research, small classes, 
and collaborative work” and for “live-client or other real-life practice 
experiences, appropriately supervised and designed to encourage reflection by 
students on their experiences and on the values and responsibilities of the 
legal profession.” American Bar Association Standards and Rules of 
Procedure for Approval of Law Sch., available at http://www.americanbar.org 
/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2013_2014_sta
ndards_chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf 
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students, usually in their second and third years, to study a 
traditional subject in greater depth or to explore a topic, 
sometimes an esoteric one, outside the core curriculum.  Indeed, 
the seminar—and a related teaching modality, the 
apprenticeship—have been part of the training of lawyers and 
advocates at least since the age of Pericles. Socrates and Aristotle 
gathered small groups around them to teach—by the Socratic 
Method, of course—rhetoric, logic and other skills associated with 
the art of persuasion. Their substantive curriculum covered a host 
of topics, not the least of which was the practice of civic virtue.13  
So by 2007, when the Carnegie Endowment published its much-
discussed tractate urging the reform of legal education through 
increasing the number of clinical courses and the exposure of 
students to mentoring by practicing professionals, all to be carried 
out with constant reference to ethical responsibilities, it was yet 
another vindication of the famous pronouncement by the author of 
the Book of Ecclesiastes that there is nothing new under the 
sun.14 
A random search of law school course lists available on the 
Internet shows that at least a dozen schools refer to those usually 
one- or two-credit, limited-enrollment classes as “Perspectives” 
courses.  This is an apt appellation as the purpose of these courses 
is to afford the student an opportunity to approach a topic from 
non-conventional viewpoints and with materials that do not place 
the decisions of appellate courts at center stage. Among the 
schools choosing this designation are Cornell, Notre Dame, and 
William and Mary; some schools add a word or two to their 
seminar offerings, so, for example, at the University of Minnesota, 
these courses are referenced as “Perspectives on the Law.”  But 
however they are denoted, they exist at all schools as supplements 
to the core doctrinal courses and the other courses, such as 
Bankruptcy Law, which are taught by lecture to large groups of 
students. Advocating that some of these “Perspectives” seminars 
be required as either compliments to, or prerequisites for, 
enrollment in some of the clinical offerings, this essay suggests 
 
 13.  See CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, 
ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (Harvard Univ. Press 1995) 
(1994). 
 14.  Ecclesiastes 1:9. 
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that the failure to use these courses to their maximum 
effectiveness is one vice of the legal curricula at many schools. 
The Carnegie Report was received by law schools as a 
summons to act self-consciously and collaboratively15 to address 
the problems besetting the legal profession by improving the 
training of new lawyers.  Whatever its shortcomings, whether it is 
a repetitive bureaucratese, few specific suggestions, or a dearth of 
cogent commentary by judges and seasoned attorneys as to what 
they see in practice, the Carnegie Report is considered an 
influential critique of the current problems within legal education, 
and its observations have resonated throughout the law school 
community. 
Law schools are now reexamining the role of clinical 
programs, how they monitor and provide constructive feedback 
other than a final exam grade to their students, and how the more 
elevated values of the profession may be transmitted by 
integrating them into the entire academic experience.  In fairness, 
it must be noted that the authors of the Carnegie Report did not 
claim to reach their conclusions at a conclave on some Parnassian 
height but acknowledged earlier efforts to move in the directions 
they recommend by law schools at the City University of New 
York, New York University and Yale.16 
As every law school dean is aware, the thesis of the Carnegie 
Report is simple and direct: law schools are turning out graduates 
who know doctrines of the law’s major topics and branches as 
enunciated in appellate decisions, but they know little about how 
to draft elementary pleadings or find the way to the courthouse, 
and once there, they do not have a clue as to what to do by way of 
filing the papers or arguing the simplest of motions to a judge.  
 
 15.  In fact, a consortium of ten law schools was assembled in 2009, two 
years after the publication of the Carnegie Report, to “promote thoughtful 
innovation in law school curricul[a]” and to implement the legal education 
reform called for in the Carnegie Report; the consortium named themselves 
the Legal Education Analysis and Reform Network, or LEARN. See Legal 
Education Analysis and Reform Network (LEARN), General Description of 
Planned Projects 2009–2010, at 10, available at http://www.albanylaw.edu 
/media/user/celt/learnprojects.pdf [hereinafter LEARN Proposal]. Although 
one of LEARN’s stated project proposals was to create a website—not only for 
the purposes of identifying their organization and mission, but also to offer a 
“rich collection of teaching resources” to legal educators—no such website has 
yet come to fruition. See id. at 16–17. 
 16.  Carnegie Report, supra note 9, at 43–44, 119–20. 
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Worse, the Carnegie Report maintains that the newly minted 
lawyers are ignorant of ethical and professional responsibilities 
and consider that their only moral mandate is to wage a zealous 
crusade on behalf of their client.  Considerations of justice are few 
or nonexistent, and in any event are suspended while the student 
devotes herself to learning legal doctrine and “how to think like a 
lawyer.”17 
To rectify this sorry state, the Carnegie Report recommends 
increased clinical education that will expose the student to a 
variety of real-life clients with controversies placed before real-life 
courts and administrative tribunals. The Carnegie Report’s 
authors opt for “an integrative strategy for legal education”18 in 
which the “more effective way to teach is to keep the analytical 
and the moral, the procedural and the substantive in dialogue 
throughout the process of learning the law.”19 
This bland and benign generalization characterizes the 
Carnegie Report’s critique, as does a paucity of concrete 
recommendations, so the profession was delivered a call to arms 
but furnished little in the way of ammunition. But a platitudinous 
(even if they are well-meaning and occasionally helpful platitudes) 
bureaucratese is not the only shortcoming of the Carnegie Report. 
Of the Carnegie Report’s five co-authors, only one, Judith 
Welch Wegner, has any background in the law, and hers has been 
primarily as an academic and a law school dean,20 with little or no 
 
 17.  Id. at 51–54, 187. 
 18.  Id. at 191. 
 19.  Id. at 142. 
 20.  Id. at ix–x. William Sullivan is a former philosophy professor and 
serves as the co-director of the Carnegie Foundation’s Preparations for the 
Professions Program, with research experience in identifying distinct 
practices in professional education. Int’l Conference on the Future of Legal 
Educ.: Conference Participants, GEORGIA STATE U. COLLEGE OF LAW, 
http://law.gsu.edu/events/index/FoLE/speakers?name=sullivan (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2013). Anne Colby is a developmental psychologist, a professor at 
Stanford University, and formerly the director of Harvard’s Murray Research 
Center and a Senior Scholar at the Carnegie Foundation. Stanford Ctr. on 
Adolescence, STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., http://coa.stanford.edu/ 
people/anne-colby (last visited Sept. 13, 2012). Judith Welch Wegner is 
former dean of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Law School, 
with professional experience as law clerk, attorney-advisor, appellate 
attorney for the United States Department of Justice, and special assistant to 
United States Secretary of Education Shirley M. Hufstedler. Faculty and 
Research: Judith Welch Wegner, U. NORTH CAROLINA SCH. OF LAW, http:// 
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background in the court room, where lawyering skills, or a lack 
thereof, are always on display.  Her fellow authors have 
backgrounds in sociology, psychology, and educational theory but 
none has a biography that includes any examination of the 
cultural, political, or practical dimensions of the judicial system.  
Though the authors spent time visiting a number of law schools, 
where they observed classes and spoke to students and professors, 
there is no indication that they watched any trials or learned 
about the current caliber of advocacy from those most 
appropriately positioned to observe it, trial and appellate judges.  
Moreover, clients could also provide rich insights about how 
lawyers had represented their interests, but this cohort was also 
overlooked.21 
In any event, the Carnegie Report’s integrative model 
requires that at different points during their law school careers, 
small groups of students should be supervised and mentored by 
professors and instructors with appropriate doctrinal and 
experiential credentials.  It is difficult to disagree with the 
 
www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/wegnerjudithwelch/ (last visited Nov. 14, 
2013).  Lloyd Bond is a professor at the University of North Carolina-
Greensboro, with research interests that include psychological and 
educational measurement and the measurement of teaching ability, and has 
served as a Fellow of the American Psychological Association, a Carnegie 
Foundation Senior Scholar, and various other scientific committees. Lloyd 
Bond Named as Carnegie Senior Scholar, CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/press-
releases/lloyd-bond-named-carnegie-senior-scholar (last modified Sept. 2002). 
Lee Shulman served as the eighth President Emeritus of the Carnegie 
Foundation, with professional experience as a professor of educational 
psychology and a researcher of teacher and teaching education, cognitive 
processes of medical problem solving, and studies of medical reasoning. 
Academic Symposium Keynote Speaker: Lee S. Shulman, UNIV. OF VIRGINIA, 
http://www.virginia.edu/inauguration/shulman.html (last visited Sept. 13, 
2012). 
 21.  Naturally, locating a sampling of clients and then getting them to 
comment may prove difficult, but those in high-profile cases might be 
forthcoming as would those who were acquitted after a criminal trial; and 
perhaps their less fortunate colleagues sitting in jail after sentencing might 
have something to contribute. Needless to say, results would undoubtedly 
create bias one way or the other, but even clients with adverse outcomes 
could provide insight on their attorneys’ zeal for the case and concern for 
them as people. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said, “even a dog distinguishes 
between being stumbled over and being kicked.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 
JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Stuart E. Thiel & David Widger eds., trans.,  2013) 
(1881). 
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Carnegie Report’s theme that doctrinal courses should be 
complimented with practical clinical experiences and that law and 
lawyering should be placed within the context of moral 
responsibilities to clients with concrete legal problems and 
undergirded with an abiding awareness of the integrity required 
of each participant in the legal system. 
Clinics, standing alone as vocational training workshops, will 
not fit the bill.  As Professor Carl Bogus observed a decade before 
the publication of the Carnegie Report, clinics, or skills courses, 
unaccompanied by substantive explorations, do not equip the 
student for responsible conduct. “It is all too easy for the law to 
slide into formalism or place too great an emphasis on technique,” 
he warned.22 
Skeptics, of course, would say that because the clinical 
experience will necessarily be confined to, for example, a law 
student representing an individual with a minor problem in front 
of a low-level administrative tribunal or court, no skills will be 
gained that could not be picked up after graduation during the 
first four months of actual practice with a law firm or at a 
government agency.  The rejoinder to this criticism is that the 
close supervision and the dialectic with the professor and other 
students and the value gained from that interaction, will not be 
found at the average firm or agency. 
II. THE STUDENTS’ HUMANITIES DEFICIT 
Any generalization about a group as large and diverse as the 
law school student population is subject to criticism by 
demonstrating the existence of plentiful exceptions to the general 
assertion.  Law schools admit academic stars, some with advanced 
degrees in everything from philosophy to comparative literature to 
engineering, as well as mature students a number of years out of 
college who have experience in such fields as journalism, teaching, 
law enforcement and community organizing.  But if my encounters 
– and those of fellow law professors – with law students constitute 
a barometer, the students lack an awareness of their own culture, 
both high and popular, as well the ethical dimensions of legal, 
social, and political issues, and the philosophical and historical 
ideas that must be referenced in attempts to solve them.  Thus, 
 
 22. See Bogus, supra note 11, at 944. 
FORTUNATOFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2014  10:02 AM 
10 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:1 
remediation may be in order. 
During my twenty-four years in trial and appellate practice 
and my thirteen years as a trial judge in a court of general 
jurisdiction, I regularly used the service of law clerks that were 
enrolled in law schools.  Their research services were invariably 
helpful, but through discussions with them, it became clear to me 
that, through no fault of their own, high schools and colleges had 
failed to give them a broad grounding in the humanities and 
therefore the development of the critical, analytical and forensic 
skills generally associated with such study had been stunted. 
A couple of examples stand out.  A young woman who had 
graduated from one of the original Seven Sister colleges with a 
major in American literature did not know of the existence of 
Allen Ginsberg or any of the Beats.  Whatever one’s opinion of the 
output of this group of renegade poets and novelists, surely a 
student of American literature should have been exposed to them?  
Another student, who I employed to assist on research for a book 
review about an anti-war activist, had graduated from one of the 
United States service academies and then spent more than a 
decade in the military before entering law school and yet, he had 
never taken a course on the Vietnam War,23 nor had he studied it 
in any depth in a survey course in military history. 
In short, the majority of people entering law school, like the 
majority of their fellow college graduates, have an inadequate 
foundation in the humanities.  This is a fact that professors and 
administrators at the nation’s colleges and universities have 
bemoaned for at least the past ten years, and some prescient  
Cassandras sounded the alarm about this unfolding phenomenon 
 
 23.  He reported that one was not offered at the academy he attended, 
and to this day there is no such course listed in the curriculum. To date, the 
United States Naval Academy and the United States Air Force Academy offer 
limited courses (perhaps one or two) that cover topics related to the Viet Nam 
War, and the United States Military Academy does not offer any history 
courses (whether military history or American history) which focus on issues 
raised by the Viet Nam War. See United States Naval Academy, Course 
Information, US NAVAL ACADAMY COURSES, http://www.usna.edu/acdean/ 
courses/all_courses.html; United States Air Force Academy, Curriculum 
Handbook (2009), http://www.usafa.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-
090508-044.pdf; United States Military Academy, Curriculum and Course 
Discriptions, ACADEMIC PROGRAM, http://www.usma.edu/curriculum/RedBook/ 
AY13_RedBook.pdf. 
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even earlier.24  These critiques range from memoirs to screeds to 
dispassionate analyses scrutinizing the economic disparities 
among university departments engendered by government grant 
policies, which favor the applied sciences and marginalize the 
humanities.  But the conclusions are all the same: humanities 
departments get short shrift with funding and students get short-
changed when it comes to acquiring a familiarity with the canon of 
world literature, or to use Matthew Arnold’s oft-quoted phrase, 
“the best which has been thought and said in the world. . .”25  Of 
course, the students also rarely see out humanities courses as the 
pressures on them from their schools, their families, and their own 
looming debt is to take “practical” courses and pursue a vocational 
program. 
The consensus of the critics is that the greatest problems are 
at second- and third-tier institutions, not at the handful of elite, 
well-endowed colleges and universities, though at these more 
esteemed venues the humanities are placed before the student as 
a smorgasbord with little structure or coherence.  Hacker and  
Dreifus collate the available data in their narrative and also 
illustrate their conclusions with charts: “English now attracts only 
half the majors it did in the mid-1960s, while history and foreign 
languages and literature have even fewer survivors.”26  An 
accompanying chart shows that for every one thousand bachelor’s 
degrees awarded between 1968 and 2008, the number of 
vocational majors has jumped from 498 to 642, with a concomitant 
decline in liberal arts concentrations, e.g., degrees awarded in the 
social sciences declined from 191 to 108 and those in the 
 
 24.  See, e.g., ANDREW DELBANCO, COLLEGE: WHAT IT WAS, IS, AND SHOULD 
BE (2012); ANDREW HACKER & CLAUDIA DREIFUS, HIGHER EDUCATION?: HOW 
COLLEGES ARE WASTING OUR MONEY AND FAILING OUR KIDS—AND WHAT WE 
CAN DO ABOUT IT (Times Books 2010); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, NOT FOR PROFIT: 
WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE HUMANITIES (Princeton Univ. Press 2010); ELLEN 
SCHRECKER, THE LOST SOUL OF HIGHER EDUCATION: CORPORATIZATION, THE 
ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND THE END OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
(2010); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, EDUCATION’S END: WHY OUR COLLEGES AND 
UNIVERSITIES HAVE GIVEN UP ON THE MEANING OF LIFE (Caravan Books 2007); 
STANLEY ARONOWITZ, THE KNOWLEDGE FACTORY: DISMANTLING THE CORPORATE 
UNIVERSITY AND CREATING TRUE HIGHER LEARNING (2000); ALVIN B. KERNAN, 
IN PLATO’S CAVE (Yale University Press 1999). 
 25.  MATTHEW ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY 5 (Yale University Press 
1964) (1869). 
 26.  HACKER & DREIFUS, supra note 24, at 99. 
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humanities from 115 to 86.27 
For Arnold as well as current champions of the humanities in 
today’s culture wars, the great ideas embodied in classic works of 
literature are worthy of study because of their intrinsic value and 
the pleasure and enlightenment they bring to the student.  
Beyond this, there are also important ancillary reasons for 
becoming conversant with the canon. 
Matthew Arnold himself believed such study would help the 
individual move toward spiritual perfection.  One of the twentieth 
century’s most important proponents of the necessity of studying 
the classics, or Great Books, gave a more utilitarian cast 
regarding purpose.  Robert M. Hutchins, who just before the 
middle of the past century served as Professor and Dean of the 
Yale Law School and later as President of the University of 
Chicago, noted that occupations were not simply about performing 
specific tasks but existed within “moral, social, scientific, and 
intellectual contexts.”28  Thus, the purpose of education was to 
prepare the student to work for societal reform rather than to 
simply learn guidelines for social adjustment and conformity.29 
Which works of literature should constitute the canon is but 
one of the questions for educators seeking a relevant curriculum.  
Then there is the related question of the existence of sub-canons; 
not long ago the Journal of Legal Education made its pages 
available to a forum that posed the question as to whether there 
was a legal canon.30  The offerings provided a display of 
intellectual firepower and wit by such luminaries as Stanley Fish, 
Derrick Bell and Cass Sunstein but little of substance was 
 
 27.  Id. at 100. See also U.S. Department of Education, Fast Facts, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts 
/display.asp?id=37 (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (figures collated from U.S. 
Department of Education research by the National Center for Education 
Statistics, which show that of the 1,650,000 bachelor’s degrees conferred in 
2009–10, 358,000 were for majors in business, more than twice as many as 
the 173,000 awarded to social science and history majors). 
 28.  ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, THE GREAT CONVERSATION: THE SUBSTANCE OF 
A LIBERAL EDUCATION 11–12 (Britannica Great Books 1952). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See Derrick A. Bell, Multiple Cultures and the Law: Do We Have a 
Legal Canon?, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1993); Stanley Fish, Not of an Age, But 
for All Time: Canons and Postmodernism, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1993) 
[hereinafter Fish, Not of an Age]; Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of Liberal 
Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22 (1993). 
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suggested about any cases or treatises that should be included in 
such a canon. And for some there are the wider questions of 
whether the study of the great works of Western—or world— 
culture should be offered to all or to just to the gifted, and whether 
such a pursuit has any value to either the individual or the larger 
community.31 
For Stanley Fish, the lawyer and literary critic, “[t]he 
humanities are their own good,” but “[t]o the question ‘of what use 
are the humanities? the only honest answer is none 
whatsoever’.”32  As for canons of any type, Fish, who describes 
himself as “characteristically perverse,”33 proclaims, “they 
function not to encourage thought, but to stop it.  Canonical 
materials, when they are exerting their full force, draw a line in 
the sand, but with an air suggesting that the sand is a monument 
of steel.”34  Katha Pollitt, the columnist and social critic, endorses 
the study of what most literate people would agree are the 
classics, but joins with Fish in her skepticism that any benefit 
from them outside of personal pleasure is dubious:  “But is there 
any list of a few dozen books that can have . . . a magical effect, for 
good or for ill? Of course not.”35 
Surely Thomas Jefferson, John Dewey, and a host of others 
who have linked the survival of democracy to an educated 
citizenry would disagree with the crabbed notions of Fish and 
Pollitt about the value of the humanities, even though the 
advocates of such study might disagree as to what works merit 
inclusion in the canon.  One interested in the law would have to be 
comatose not to be stimulated by Aristotle or H. L. A. Hart, or a 
 
 31.  See The Heart of the Matter, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & 
SCIENCES: COMMISSION ON THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (June 19, 
2013), available at http://www.humanitiescommission.org/_pdf/hss_report.pdf 
(the most recent governmental and establishmentarian endorsement of 
humanities studies—for kindergarten through college). The Carnegie 
Report’s subtitle, “The Humanities and Social Sciences: for a vibrant 
competitive, and secure nation,” reveals the authors’ utilitarian objectives for 
such pursuits. See id. 
 32.  Stanley Fish, Will the Humanities Save Us?, N.Y. TIMES: THE 
OPINION PAGES (Jan. 6, 2008, 5:31 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com 
/2008/01/06/will-the-humanities-save-us/. 
 33.  Fish, Not of an Age, supra note 30, at 12. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Katha Pollitt, Why We Read: Canon to the Right of Me, REASONABLE 
CREATURES 16, 24 (Vintage Paperback 1995) (1994). 
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reading of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett36 or 
Miranda v. Arizona.37 
The authors of canonical texts have never required a slavish 
agreement by students or other readers, nor would any 
responsible teacher do so. Contrary to Fish’s assertion that the 
canon stifles inquiry, it stimulates it.  Robert Hutchins had it 
right when he said of the canon:  “What makes them great is, 
among other things, that they teach you something every time you 
read them.  Every time, you see something you had not seen 
before[.]”38  Of course, revering  the humanities is not enough; as 
the educational reformer Jonathan Kozol points out:  humanists, 
to make their studies serve the community, must leave their 
libraries and “ . . . participate in unfamiliar, openly political, and 
therefore highly dangerous assaults upon societal injustice . . . ”39 
As if the notion that exposing students to great histories, 
poems, or philosophical disquisitions serves no purpose other than 
the pleasure of reading them were not enough to give pause when 
considering curriculum reform, one of the authors of the Carnegie 
Report has questioned whether the clinical training, which it so 
strenuously promotes, has any correlation with successful 
performance as a lawyer.  Two years after the Carnegie Report 
was released, Judith Welch Wegner, the only co-author with legal 
training, wrote:  “[I]t is unclear whether effectiveness in practice 
correlates with course work (including skills related courses and 
clinical participation).”40 
So with a tentativeness about outcomes on the part of some 
reputable scholars regarding the efficacy of programs of study 
they themselves endorse to improve society generally and the 
legal profession in particular, deans and professors seeking to 
design a relevant and reformative curriculum have little choice 
but to rely heavily upon their own observations and experiences as 
well as their encounters with lawyers and judges active in the 
profession.  This would naturally include reflections about the 
lawyer as not only a counselor and advocate but as a proponent 
 
 36.  319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 37.  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 38.  HUTCHINS, supra note 28, at 75. 
 39.  JONATHAN KOZOL, ILLITERATE AMERICA 170 (Doubleday 1985). 
 40. Judith Welch Wegner, Response: More Complicated Than We Think,  
59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 623, 636 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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and champion of democratic values in the community. 
From my experience as a lawyer and judge, I can say 
anecdotally that I encountered stellar performances (in court and 
at the negotiation or deposition table) ten percent of the time, 
competent lawyering eighty percent of the time, and blundering 
bordering on malpractice in the remaining ten percent. The most 
capable attorneys came from every tier of law school and from 
diverse backgrounds.  I had no way of knowing who went home at 
night, put on Bach’s cello concertos, and curled up with 
Montaigne, Swift, or The Federalist.  I do know, however, as 
anyone interested can verify, that those universally considered 
titans of the American legal profession – Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison, John Marshall, Abraham Lincoln, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, Earl Warren, and 
Thurgood Marshall – read widely and voraciously. 
It is beyond the scope of this essay to recite the numerous 
plaints about higher education found in the books I have adverted 
to any more than it is my purpose to design a comprehensive 
model law school curriculum.  But for those of us entrusted with 
the training of aspirants to the legal profession, it is incumbent to 
know what intellectual foundation most of our students are 
bringing to law school and how familiar they are with the 
humanities tradition of which the legal system has been a part for 
centuries.  Sadly, the answer for the latter question is, “Not very.”  
Additionally, it is important for us to reflect on what subjects and 
values we wish to inculcate beyond technical skills, even though 
many students themselves would state their goal is no loftier than 
to obtain admission into a profession that provides prestige and an 
opportunity for financial reward. 
III. LAW SCHOOLS AND THE LAWYERS THEY WISH TO MOLD 
It is of course easier to determine the background an entering 
student presents upon arrival at law school than it is to design 
courses that will enhance the law school experience and create 
competent and ethical, if not superlative, lawyers by 
supplementing the core doctrinal courses and others oriented 
toward preparation for the bar exam and the inculcation of basic 
skills.  Thus, to answer the question of what the preferred and 
most beneficial non-core studies, or perspectives courses, should 
be, it is preliminarily necessary for the law school to have a vision 
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of who, or what, the aspiring lawyers should be upon graduation. 
We know that for stand-up comedians and cocktail party 
cynics, lawyers are sharks and bottom-feeders, but this is clearly 
not the composite any responsible dean or law professor wishes to 
create.  For Anthony Kronman, a former dean of the Yale Law 
School, regardless of what some lawyers have done to warrant the 
pejorative appellations bestowed on them by comedians, lawyers 
should be groomed to wear the mantel of statesmen.41  Or, if a 
gender-neutral term is preferred, their calling must be that of 
diplomats with a high-minded and socially-conscious portfolio.  
Fifty years before Dean Kronman’s call for the profession to save 
its collective soul, two other distinguished Yale law professors, 
Harold Laswell and Meyers McDougal urged another elevated role 
for the lawyer, that of policy-maker.42 
Laswell and McDougal were not envisioning this role for 
every car accident case or every misdemeanor prosecution, though 
it is not difficult to imagine cases in these categories that require 
resolutions demanding more than technical skills.  The two 
authors were also not confining the term policy-maker to cabinet-
level positions in federal, state or local government. Rather, for 
them, lawyers who make policy, or counsel policy-makers, are 
everywhere, on stages grand and small, public and private. 
It should need no emphasis that the lawyer is today, even 
when not himself a “maker” of policy, the indispensible adviser of 
every responsible policy-maker of our society—whether we speak 
of the head of a government department or agency, of the 
executive of a corporation or labor union, of the secretary of a 
trade or other private association, or even of the humble 
independent enterpriser or professional man.  As such an adviser, 
when advising his policy-maker of what he can or cannot legally 
do is, as policy-makers often complain, in an unassailably 
strategic position to influence, if not create, policy.43 
The ubiquity of lawyers that Laswell and McDougal noted in 
1943 obtains even more so today, and contemporary social and 
political conditions invite the same question the professors raised 
 
 41.  KRONMAN, supra note 11. 
 42.  Harold D. Laswell & Meyers S. McDougal, Legal Education and 
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 
208 (1943). 
 43.  Id. at 208–09. 
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when they wondered “. . .whether the lawyer can be held 
responsible for the plight in which we find ourselves.”44  And the 
answer we give today is unfortunately no different from the one 
they supplied: “most assuredly, yes.”45 
Lawyers are everywhere.  They regularly occupy elective and 
appointive offices from the White House to zoning boards and 
school committees or are available to provide counsel to these 
same officials.  Lawyers advise corporations and banks, including 
ones that pollute air and rivers and drive individuals and 
communities over financial cliffs.  And lawyers supplied the legal 
and moral underpinning, such as it was, for the embrace by the 
United States government of torture as a weapon in its foreign 
policy.46 For many of us in the profession, it was anything but 
uplifting to read of a United States Supreme Court Justice, one 
Antonin Scalia, musing on the political necessity and 
constitutional propriety of sometimes forcibly removing finger 
nails from a defenseless prisoner.47 
All is not unremittingly grim, however. Intrepid and 
courageous lawyers, including some serving in the military, have 
exposed the depredations of two presidential administrations 
waging the so-called War on Terror and continually fight for the 
principles of due process to be applied on behalf of those scorned 
(or ignored) by the majority.  Whenever challenges are mounted to 
improve the plight of the homeless, the racially marginalized, the 
addicted, the undocumented and the generally neglected, lawyers 
can be found collecting facts, writing briefs, and pounding on the 
courthouse door for redress. 
Lawyers involved in these matters, and in many others 
involving liberty interests, must undertake these types of cases if 
the profession is to discharge its mandate to protect and preserve 
democratic values.  At least, that is the way Laswell and 
 
 44.  Id. at 208. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See, e.g., John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 793, 793–95 (2004); see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY 
TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE 
CHALLENGE (Yale University Press 2002). 
 47.  Raphael G. Satter, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia Says “So-
Called Torture” Cannot Be Ruled Out, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 12, 2008), 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23153116/ns/world_news- 
terrorism/t/scalia-so-called-torture-cannot-be-ruled-out/#.UDYmGOe5dM. 
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McDougal saw it as they assigned a special responsibility to law 
schools: “The proper function of our law schools is, in short, to 
contribute to the training of policy-makers for the ever more 
complete achievement of the democratic values that constitute the 
professed ends of American polity.”48 
Implicit in this call for the instilling of “democratic values” 
are the larger questions of what the outer reaches of those values 
are, and what the “ends” of the American polity are, or should be.  
The strident and intractable temper of current political debate is 
but one barometer measuring the divergence of opinion on issues 
that twenty years ago were considered resolved, at least in theory.  
Among these issues are abortion, birth control, gender pay parity, 
separation of church and state, racial profiling, etc.  Most law 
schools will undoubtedly draw their students from across the 
political and ideological spectrum just as they attract a fair 
grouping of those who simply want a license to enter what they 
understand to be a trade, albeit a sophisticated one.This will not 
be an easy task. Crafting a mission and a curriculum that 
represents “democratic values” designed to address and reform 
contemporary societal problems through the agency of Kronman’s 
statesmen or Laswell and McDougal’s policy-makers will require a 
law school to first clarify its own mission and then to marshal 
some backbone and self-confidence to push it.  Complicating this 
task is the central tenet of the adversarial system which holds 
that everyone is entitled to legal representation; and thus lawyers 
are obliged to represent snakes as well as saints and every grade 
of goodness and evil in between.  So the persistent question 
remains: what type of legal education fits all (or most)? 
Laswell and McDougal ventured an answer that attempts to 
mesh the law school’s desire to inculcate into its students a 
commitment to ethical conduct in the pursuit of democratic values 
with a respect for the sensibilities of the individual student: 
In a democratic society it should not, of course, be an aim of 
legal education to impose a single standard of morals upon every 
student.  But a legitimate aim of education is to seek to promote 
the major values of a democratic society and to reduce the number 
of moral mavericks who do not share democratic preferences. The 
student may be allowed to reject the morals of democracy and 
 
 48.  Laswell & McDougal, supra note 42, at 206. 
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embrace those of despotism; but his education should be such that, 
if he does so, he does it by deliberate choice, with awareness of the 
consequences for himself and others, and not by sluggish self-
deception.49 
Law schools are clearly under no obligation to design a 
curriculum that provides instructions on how to conceal police 
brutality, send blacks to the back of the bus, and deny full 
participation in civic life to all but those who can prove their 
heterosexuality.  Noxious ideas that may be freely espoused in the 
town park have no place in law school.  That people who engage in 
racist or homophobic behavior are entitled to a defense if they are 
charged with a violation of the law does not translate into an 
affirmative duty to teach their odious doctrines in law school, or 
any other school for that matter. 
I reference these extreme situations not because a significant 
population of law school administrators wishes to promote anti-
democratic values but because law students reflect the larger 
polity from which they are drawn; and thus, there is no assurance 
that they are universally or unwaveringly committed to 
democratic values and social justice.  How could they all be if some 
spring from the same soil that has given us the racist, 
homophobic, and xenophobic blather mouthed daily by countless 
elected officials and talk show hosts in every section of the 
country?  Yet Laswell and McDougal sensibly argue that while the 
curriculum need not adjust to the undemocratic sentiments of any 
student or group of students, such students should neither be 
expelled nor penalized for chafing at the law school’s promotion of 
democratic values. 
A law school’s promotion of values as advocated by Laswell 
and McDougal, Kronman, and the authors of the Carnegie Report, 
may appear counterintuitive to the vaunted principle of academic 
neutrality, that is, the professor in a given course supplies the 
scholarly information with a survey of responsible critiques and 
then lets the student come to her own conclusions.  Here is what 
Dickens wrote, here are the times he lived in, here is what 
reputable critics have said, now you decide.  This approach may 
suffice when discussing the Romantic poets or even the black 
letter laws of offer and acceptance or libel and slander, but a 
 
 49.  Laswell & McDougal, supra note 42, at 212. 
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different dynamic operates if the questions are, for example, 
whether legal services should be available for those facing 
deportation, whether detainees should be held indefinitely without 
trial, or whether gays should be permitted to marry.  Could a law 
school seeking to produce graduates ready and eager to serve the 
public interest in a purportedly democratic society fairly answer 
these questions in the negative or positive? 
Such tensions as those that exist between academic neutrality 
and the advocacy of democratic values are surely intensified by 
the adversarial system and its premise that all sides to a dispute 
are entitled to be heard.  However, this still begs the question of a 
lawyer’s responsibility regarding the kind and quality of 
representation he or she is obliged to provide.  There is, after all, a 
qualitative difference between vigorously defending a person 
accused of war crimes and affirmatively assisting a client, even a 
president, in circumventing, if not obliterating, the strictures of 
the Geneva Conventions and other laws, domestic and 
international, which proscribe torture.50 
Similarly, while it is perfectly acceptable for an attorney to 
represent management’s interests in a labor dispute, is it ethically 
acceptable for the attorney to design a strategy for an employer to 
undermine workers’ rights and intentionally consign employees to 
unsafe conditions at the minimum wage, albeit a lawful one?  And 
was it morally proper for one of the most prominent former 
constitutional law professor in the country to direct his advocates 
to argue to the United States Supreme Court that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit strip searches of misdemeanor 
arrestees without any probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
whatsoever indicating they might be in possession of contraband 
or weapons?51 
The consensus at any bar association meeting or judicial 
conference respecting a lawyer’s responsibilities regarding 
representation of either side in any of these scenarios would 
undoubtedly be that the lawyer may do virtually anything to 
 
 50.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006) (codifying the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which became effective December 10, 
1984). 
 51.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 132 
S.Ct. 1510 (2012). 
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further the client’s objectives so long as no fraud or lying is 
involved and legal justifications are in the realm of the plausible.  
So long as the adversarial system remains governed by such 
guidelines as those found in Rule 11,52 no change in this dominant 
viewpoint is likely. However, this does not obligate the law schools 
to follow suit. 
As the gatekeepers for those who wish to enter the profession, 
the schools are ideally positioned to shape the character and 
professionalism of lawyers so they will not shirk from redirecting 
their clients away from a socially destructive path, even if the law 
could be used to justify it.  Just as the ethical divorce lawyer will 
not help a hurt and furious spouse avoid child support payments 
or frustrate visitation rights, even if the marriage partner was a 
scoundrel and cheater but a decent parent nonetheless, shouldn’t 
lawyers put the brakes on polluters and usurers even if 
responsible conduct diminishes the profit margin? 
That problems of morale, competency, and ethics, not to 
mention angst about income potential on the part of recent law 
school graduates, permeate the legal profession is beyond cavil.  
The New York Times has regularly chronicled these phenomena 
and the malaise they engender for the past several years.53  It is 
small consolation that every other political and social institution 
in the United States is failing or faltering when measured against 
some past ideal, real or fanciful.  Some of these failing political 
institutions include: political gridlock in Washington and 
elsewhere; a costly and cumbersome health care system; shooting 
wars on many fronts; chronic poverty for millions and a persistent 
societal inability to more equitably distribute the boons of record-
 
 52.  Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part: “ . . . By presenting to the court a 
pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney . . . certifies that to 
the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief . . . the claims, 
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or 
for establishing new law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 53.  See James B. Stewart, Dewey’s Fall Underscores Law Firms’ New 
Reality, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2012, at B1; Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf 
Crisis Mirrors the Legal Industry’s Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, at B7; 
David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 20, 2011, at A1; David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BU1; David Segal, Behind the Curve, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 1, 2011, at BU1. 
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high corporate profits; decayed and decaying infrastructure; and 
elementary and secondary schools, and colleges and universities, 
providing educations that many responsible critics say are 
inadequate. 
Given the intelligent, problem-solving, and even aggressive, 
personality imbedded in many of those attracted to the law as a 
career, it should come as no surprise that some of these people 
have resolved to fix the problems besetting the profession; and 
some within this hardy group have resolved to do this by 
reforming law schools.  Although the profession’s difficulties are 
complex, ill-defined, and generally difficult to study and quantify 
in the field, i.e., places such as the courtroom and the lawyer’s 
office, this is not viewed as an obstacle by these intrepid 
reformers.  Some of these critics and reformers, it must be said, 
find no worth in any current law school curriculum, as if the 
overwhelming majority of graduates cannot distinguish the 
hearsay rule from res ipsa loquitur.54 
Though the Carnegie Report has its shortcomings and often 
replows the field, it should not be ignored or dismissed.  On the 
contrary, the discussions it stimulats and actions it  provokes will 
continue to help law schools evaluate and improve their services.  
And these discussions have taken place not only within individual 
law schools but across the spectrum of legal education. 
A consortium of ten law schools called the Legal Education 
Analysis and Reform Network (LEARN)55 was formed in 2009  
with the express goal of working together to solidfy, for their 
students, some of the reforms the Carnegie Report recommended.  
Their self-appointed mission,56 in sum, is to “promote thoughtful 
innovation” in law schools’ curricula by teaching a variety of 
 
 54.  See, e.g., Ethan Bonner, A Call for Drastic Changes in Educating 
New Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at A11. 
 55.  The LEARN consortium consists of the following participating 
schools: CUNY Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard 
Law School, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington), New York 
University School of Law, Southwestern Law School, Stanford Law School, 
University of Dayton School of Law, University of New Mexico Law School, 
and Vanderbilt University Law School. See LEARN Proposal, supra note 15, 
at 5. 
 56.  LEARN has not to date published or announced a definitive mission 
statement that could be referenced here, however, their primary objectives 
are set forth in contents of the LEARN Proposal. See LEARN Proposal, supra 
note 15. 
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subjects in an array of practical learning environments, exploring 
the best ways to transmit the recommendations of the Carnegie 
Report to law school faculty members, and to examine the role 
that assessment plays in legal education.  Thus far, individual 
schools with and without LEARN have engaged in these and 
related undertakings, but how much of this activity is attributable 
to impetus from the consortium remains to be seem.57 
IV. DEVELOPING RELEVANT—AND REMEDIAL—
PERSPECTIVES COURSES 
If there is a solitary law school somewhere that does not offer 
one or two credit courses that deviate in mode of presentation and 
subject matter from the core doctrinal and bar preparatory 
courses taught by the lecture and case method, I have not located 
it.  On the contrary, a random examination of law school curricula 
shows a plethora of topics covered by seminars, sometimes aptly 
named Perspectives Courses, which have as their goal the 
introduction of legal issues and viewpoints not usually addressed 
in the principal courses.  Every law school is offering these 
courses, mostly to second and third year students.  As would be 
expected, the larger (and more prosperous) the law school, the 
greater the variety of courses offered. Many of the titles suggest 
that seminars are often presented not only to educate, but to 
entertain and divert—not, to borrow from Jerry Seinfeld, that 
there is anything wrong with that. 
The randomness of the topics coupled with an absolute 
discretion allowing the student to select any seminar she wants 
from the buffet put in front of her does not necessarily serve the 
student well when the goal is to increase professional competence.  
A law school could hardly be considered tyrannical, or even 
overbearing, if it mandated some Perspectives Courses to be taken 
in conjunction with, or as prerequisites to, certain clinical courses. 
Some law schools now already provide counseling for a student to 
follow a particular track in the second or third year if the student 
has discovered a field of possible specialization.  The law school 
would be meeting its obligation to the student and the legal 
profession if it paired a seminar with the student’s practical 
 
 57.  See id. at 10–11 (describing the three working groups that have been 
established to effectuate LEARN’s planned projects). 
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interests as revealed by her choice of a clinical course. 
To facilitate this I suggest that some of the perspectives 
courses be grouped under three rubrics:  History,58 Legal 
Profession and Social Issues, and Doctrinal.  Not every seminar 
will fit neatly into these categories, and any seminar could surely 
be taken by a student without any connection to a clinical course. 
Some subjects would necessarily be placed under two, perhaps 
all three, of the rubrics; this should be no surprise as unearthing 
the law is at bottom a historical investigation into precedent, past 
legislative intent, and the evolution of public policy.  For instance, 
one possible complement to a clinic in criminal defense would be a 
seminar in the History of the Fourth Amendment, beginning 
perhaps with the trials and travail of John Wilkes in eighteenth 
century England,59 the fulminations of James Otis,60 and/or 
Stephen Hopkins61 against the predations of King George III and 
his colonial officers on the eve of the American Revolution; but 
when these matters are measured against contemporary United 
States Supreme Court decisions in, say, Whren v. United States 62 
and Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,63 the domain of the 
Doctrinal will have been entered. 
The rubric of Legal Profession and Social Issues presents a 
litany of topics, almost all with some historical or doctrinal 
content, or both; and some of these could easily be matched with a 
relevant clinic.  In addition to the wider philosophical questions of 
to whom and to what the attorney and the profession are 
responsible, the daily ethical quandaries a lawyer experiences— 
i.e., cross-examining to discredit a witness the lawyer knows is 
telling the truth; assisting the client to conform his recollection to 
what forensic evidence shows to the contrary; deciding how much 
 
 58.  For a vigorous argument urging the teaching of history to law 
students, See Harold P. Southerland, The Case for American History in the 
Law-School Curriculum, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 661 (2007). 
 59.  See ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF 
CIVIL LIBERTY (Yale University Press 2006). 
 60.  James Otis famously decried the general warrant as “[T]he worst 
instrument of arbitrary power . . . that ever was found in an English law 
book,” a declaration admiringly cited by the United States Supreme Court in 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). 
 61.  Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of Colonies Examined (1764) (reprinted 
by The Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation: Providence 1974). 
 62.  517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 63.  132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012). 
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adverse legal research to provide against one’s own thesis; 
counseling the criminal defendant about taking the witness stand, 
etc.—would all be apt explorations in any seminar complementing 
clinics that expose the student to trial preparation and practice. 
The same could be said for a seminar focusing on the use of 
the media by lawyers to advance the cause of their client(s).  In 
today’s technological age, it is not unusual for a lawyer to be 
thrust by an aggressive media and the public declarations of one’s 
adversary into a controversy in which a grasp of both public 
relations and ethical considerations are crucial.  There are also 
circumstances that warrant the attorney initiating contact with 
the media, as when an activist organization is about to commence 
litigation addressing what they believe to be official 
transgressions. And there are numerous related topics as well, 
with which the attorney, as a leader in the community, should be 
conversant. 
These issues invariably surface if the attorney is speaking 
about the profession to a student group or civic organization.  Is it 
good and healthy that Justices Scalia and Breyer are regulars on 
talk shows, often discussing books they have written?  Are the 
“judges” on daytime reality shows real judges, and should some of 
them have their tickets pulled for routinely bringing discredit on 
the profession by unnecessarily upbraiding, insulting and 
demeaning the benighted souls who appear before them in ways 
that would make the nineteenth century judges in the somber and 
stern portraits lining courthouse walls seem like therapists on an 
Oprah show?  A seminar that explores these topics could also 
address the issue of judicial free speech as well.64  Clearly, the 
aspiring lawyers will not be functioning as judges in any clinics, 
but the subject of judicial speech is one with which a member of 
the profession should be familiar. 
Some perspectives courses will have aspects of all three 
rubrics.  This is certainly the case, for example, with an academic 
excursion into the social and legal historyof gay rights designed to 
 
 64.  See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); See also 
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, available at  http:/ 
www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnited 
StatesJudges.aspx; Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., On a Judge’s Duty to Speak 
Extrajudicially: Rethinking the Strategy of Silence, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
679 (1999). 
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better prepare students who work in clinics focusing on the rights 
of individuals in the LGBT community.  As is the case with many 
topics, the professor, full-time or adjunct, chosen to lead such a 
seminar will benefit from considerable historical spadework 
already done in this field; a stroll through the stacks of law 
reviews in an accredited law library or a visit to the law section in 
a decent bookstore—brick and mortar or Internet—will attest to 
this. 
More than ten years ago, journalists Joyce Murdoch and Deb 
Price chronicled the legal struggles waged during the twentieth 
century to strike down laws discriminating against, even 
criminalizing, gay and lesbian individuals in Courting Justice: 
Gay Men and Lesbians v. the Supreme Court.65  More recently, 
Professor Dale Carpenter of the University of Minnesota Law 
School has written in a popular style, Flagrant Conduct: The Story 
of Lawrence v. Texas,66 which shows a legal and cultural history 
complete with the strategizing and tactical maneuvering of the 
lawyers and activists involved. 
While the focal point of Flagrant Conduct is the constitutional 
challenge to a Texas sodomy statute, the book, like any seminar 
that uses it, can serve as an instructional device that goes well 
beyond the issue of gay rights.  The same can be said for the words 
Justice Anthony Kennedy used to identify the animating principle 
of his decision, reversing what the Court had said was dogma only 
seventeen years before in Bowers v. Hardwick.67  Recasting Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s immortal declaration from McCullough v. 
Maryland,68 Justice Kennedy wrote: “As the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.”69 
Thus, a perspectives course created primarily to provide a 
substantive historical and doctrinal background for students who 
have elected to work in a clinic providing legal assistance to the 
LGBT community also may create opportunities to acquaint them 
 
 65.  JOYCE MURDOCK & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND 
LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT (Basic Books 2001). 
 66.  DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. 
TEXAS  (2012). 
 67.  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 68.  McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407, 415 (1819) (“[I]t is a 
constitution we are expounding . . . intended for ages to come . . . ”). 
 69.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
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with the dynamic view of constitutional interpretation that will 
serve them well when they need to explore strategy and tactics in 
legal disputes beyond the topic of the seminar. 
The diversity of Perspectives courses will be as wide and 
adventurous as the imagination of the law school’s faculty and the 
governing entity that approves the curriculum; and this is true not 
just for seminars addressing controversial social issues but 
traditional doctrinal concerns as well.  The latter will most 
naturally arise to address a peeve of a professor regarding a 
confusion some point of doctrine may present to students, either 
because it is inherently complex or because the course in which 
the student initially meets it gives it short shrift because of the 
volume of other topics obliged to be covered. 
During my time as attorney, judge, and professor, I have 
observed gaps, if not chasms, in the understanding by lawyers, 
both young and seasoned, of some fundamental doctrines; and I 
attribute much of this to the cursory approach to these topics in 
law school.  Leading my list of peeves is the dearth of 
understanding by lawyers, and hence many judges, of the concepts 
of burden of proof and the burden of producing evidence.  While a 
course in criminal law will reference proof “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” and torts will invariably touch upon proof by “a fair 
preponderance of the evidence,” the invocation of catch phrases 
without an in depth exploration70 will hardly prepare the student 
for recognizing what evidentiary hurdles must be surmounted at 
trial or how to craft a jury instruction most favorable to one’s 
client.  Add to these two prevalent standards, the standards of 
“scintilla of evidence,” “prima facie case,” “substantial evidence” 
(especially as used in administrative settings), and “clear and 
convincing evidence” and one has more than ample fodder for a 
doctrinal Perspectives seminar just on Burdens of Proof. 
Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court over the years 
has provided considerable instruction on this topic, though, sadly, 
it has been ignored more than followed.  In the criminal law we 
have been instructed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
 
 70.  An epigram of Oliver Wendell Holmes neatly summarizes the 
problem: “It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted 
in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.” 
Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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credible and persuasive evidence which induces in the fact finder 
a “subjective state of near certitude.”71  Similar guidance has been 
provided for civil litigation.72  Seminars addressing burdens of 
proof and other evidentiary issues, such as Rule 404(b) of the 
Rules of Evidence, in a thorough manner are more than academic 
exercises because any misunderstanding leading to their 
misapplication can have dire consequences for litigants. 
The former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, Jon Newman, has argued that the 
pervasive misunderstanding of the criminal burden of proof by 
federal judges has led to the conviction of many people on a 
standard less than that constitutionally mandated.73  His thesis 
was straightforward: “I believe that the constitutional 
jurisprudence of this Nation has accepted the ‘reasonable doubt’ 
standard as a verbal formulation to be conveyed to juries in jury 
charges but has failed to take the standard as a rule of law 
against which the validity of convictions is to be judged.”74 
A last example involving History and Social Issues, with cases 
scattered over decades available for illustration, is the much-
discussed political question of judicial activism.  It is one of many 
topics that students should be familiar with if they are to protect 
not just the rights and interests of their own clients but also the 
integrity of the profession. 
Though the topic surfaces in presidential campaigns and 
senate confirmation hearings, the public remains without a sound 
understanding of what courts do and how judges decide cases 
involving matters of policy and public interest.  Judges and 
attorneys must take responsibility for this failure to educate the 
average voter as they have either ignored the debate altogether or 
have been timorous when venturing into it. 
The law is replete with pronouncements by eminent legal 
thinkers that judges, in fact, make law.  However, Chief Justice 
 
 71.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979); See also In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 254 (1910); 
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895). 
 72.  See, e.g., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 
512 U.S. 267 (1994); Concrete Pipe and Products of Cal. v. Construction 
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993). 
 73.  Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt,” 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 
980 (1993). 
 74.  Id. 
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John Roberts’s analogy at his confirmation hearing of a judge’s 
role to that of a baseball umpire calling strikes and balls  has 
carried the day in the public imagination.  While the turning of 
the words “judicial activism” into a badge of infamy was a 
Republican stratagem, the Democrats conceded the debate to their 
opponents, and today all judges flee from the epithet.  This fosters 
a popular view of the courts that is not supported by history. A 
few references will illustrate my point. 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his classic The Nature of the 
Judicial Process titled a section covering easily a fourth of his 
tract ‘The Judge as Legislator’ to explain his assertion that a 
judge “fills the open spaces in the law.”75  Oliver Wendell Holmes 
favored us with this concise observation: “I recognize without 
hesitation that judges must and do legislate.”76  And to these we 
can add the words of Judge Jerome Frank who maintained that 
those who wished for a just and humane legal system must face 
the unavoidable uncertainties in law.77  More recently, the late 
esteemed federal judge, Gerhard A. Gesell, who presided over the 
trial of Oliver North, told a gathering of lawyers and law students: 
“There is. . .not much precedent out there, and, frankly, precedent 
is frequently confused and goes both ways.”78 
These jurists undoubtedly respected the Constitution and the 
Founders. However, it is not difficult to locate in their careers a 
repeated endorsement of the need to make the law relevant to 
contemporary circumstances that our eighteenth century 
predecessors, some of them slave owners and all of them 
champions of a limited franchise, could not have imagined.  I offer 
the judicial activism controversy as an example of an undermining 
of the rule of law that is as insidious as the attacks that criticize 
personal injury lawyers, and not errant hospitals or physicians, or 
the manufacturers of defective products, for driving consumer 
prices up.  If the law schools are to heed the call of the Carnegie 
Report and others to inculcate a commitment to professional 
 
 75.  CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 118. 
 76.  Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917). 
 77.  See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 7 (1930) (“Much of 
the uncertainty of law is not an unfortunate accident: it is of immense social 
value.”). 
 78.  Edward N. Beiser, Perspectives on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 
475, 511 (1990) (Gerhard A. Gesell interview). 
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responsibility in their students, part of which is to explain the role 
of the legal system to the public, then such topics must be 
addressed and the background and history of the controversies 
and the biases of the contending disputants must be exposed and 
scrutinized. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Law schools as a group, albeit not a cohesive one, have for 
some years been offering students clinical programs and seminars 
as a supplement to the core doctrinal curriculum. An examination 
of the efficacy of these endeavors and soul-searching as to how to 
improve them has been underway at least since the publication of 
the Carnegie Report in 2007.  A random survey of law school 
catalogues, now available almost exclusively on the Internet, 
shows that clinical programs and seminars of every imaginable 
variety are offered in one quantity or another at all of the nation’s 
law schools.  How well this cornucopia is preparing the next 
generation of attorneys to function in a competent, ethical, and 
socially useful manner remains to be seen. 
To maximize the possibility that some benefit of these 
supplemental programs will inure to both the individual lawyer 
and the larger society, it is incumbent upon the law schools to 
recognize the unfortunate deficit in the humanities the students 
are bringing to the schools; and it is also crucial that the schools 
determine what it is in addition to basic legal knowledge they 
should to impart to their students.  The answer to this question 
supplied by the Carnegie Report (in its broadest terms) and other 
commentators is a sense of ethical responsibility by lawyers to 
their clients, the judicial system, and the wider community. 
The Carnegie Report and its criticisms about the legal 
profession and legal education had distinguished precursors in 
Dean Anthony Kronman with his call for lawyers to be statesmen 
and Professors Meyers McDougal and Harold Laswell insisting 
that law schools be mindful that lawyers are policy-makers with a 
responsibility to maintain and expand democratic values. 
While esoteric and entertaining Perspectives courses have 
their place, the suggestion of this essay is that schools design 
some of their seminars to relate directly to the practical clinics 
being offered.  I propose three rubrics toward this end: History, 
Legal Profession and Social Issues, and Doctrinal. This is hardly 
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an exhaustive list, but within the ones I suggest, ample 
opportunities will be available for the student to encounter an in-
depth exposure to the history and literature in the topic being 
addressed by a complimentary clinic or core course. This will give 
the student a more comprehensive grasp of the subject at hand 
while providing the ancillary benefit of remedying the humanities 
deficit so prevalent among most college graduates. 
I have advocated that some of these seminars be required as 
supplements to, or prerequisites for, certain core courses or clinics.  
If such a mandate for second and third year students runs counter 
to the culture at a given school, then the student can be strongly 
urged to enroll in the complimentary perspectives course. 
Though to assess any causal nexus between law school 
performance and superlative and ethically responsible lawyering 
is difficult, it is not a stretch to say that providing students a 
background in the history and philosophy of a legal issue, be it the 
Fourth Amendment or eminent domain or anything else, will 
measurably increase their efficacy as advocates and community 
leaders, whether the audience is an appellate court, the readers of 
an editorial, or a political or civic group. 
 
